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In terms of prediction by Epstein’s integrative theory of personality, cognitive-experiential
self-theory (CEST), those people with experiential-intuitive cognitive style are more inclined
to induce errors than the other people with analytical-rational cognitive style in the
conjunction fallacy (two events that can occur together are seen as more likely than at
least one of the two events). We tested this prediction in a revised Linda problem. The
results revealed that rational and experiential cognitive styles do not statistically inﬂuence
the propensity for committing the conjunction fallacy, which is contrary to the CEST’s
predictions. Based on the assumption that the rational vs. experiential processing is a
personality trait with comparatively stabile specialities, these ﬁndings preliminarily indicate
that those people who are characterized by “rational thinking” are not more inclined to use
Bayes’ deduction than the other people who are labeled by “intuitive thinking” or by “poor
thinking.”
Keywords: conjunction fallacy, cognitive style, individual differences, information processing
INTRODUCTION
Traditional assumptions about rationality presume that when
people deduce, their judgment should abide by Bayes’ Rule
(Morris, 1974, 1977). However, since Simon (1957) proposed
the idea of bounded rationality, a signiﬁcant amount of exper-
imental and ﬁeld evidence suggests that people sometimes do
not perform perfectly due to inner or outer factor restrictions
such as cognitive limitations, logical errors, misapprehensive
implication, pressured time allocation, or varying contents. In
particular, studies based onprobability judgment suggest that peo-
ple often show biases (e.g., base-rate neglect, conjunction fallacy,
disjunction fallacy, hindsight bias, overconﬁdence, and sample-
size neglect) in the probabilistic (Bayesian) inference tasks and
therefore violate some fundamental key properties of classical
probability theory. Among these biases, the conjunction fallacy
is a related phenomenon that has been well-researched in the past
30 years and becomes one necessary component in bias and fallacy
studies.
CONJUNCTION FALLACY AND COGNITIVE STYLES
The conjunction fallacy explores how individuals commonly vio-
late a basic probability rule by estimating probability of conjunc-
tion of two statements to be more probable than the probability
they assign to at least one of its constituent statements. Tversky
and Kahneman (1983) ﬁrst proposed the conjunction fallacy. In
their seminal study, they presented participants with an afterward
well-known probability judgment scenario named the LINDA task.
A hypothetical woman named Linda as well as a personality sketch
on some of her characteristic and activities functioned as the tar-
get E on which they later asked the participants to make judgment
about Linda.
(E) Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored
in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in antinuclear
demonstrations.
After reading the description of that target E, they requested the
participants to estimate the probability of a number of statements
that were true referring to E. Three statements are included as
follows:
(T) Linda is a bank teller.
(F) Linda is active in the feminist movement.
(T ∧ F) Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.
The participants should estimate the individual statement T as
more likely than the conjunction T ∧ F since it is impossible
for Linda to be a feminist bank teller without also being a bank
teller. However, a signiﬁcant amount of later studies found that
the majority of respondents commit single conjunction fallacy
and even double conjunction fallacy (e.g., Abelson et al., 1987;
Fantino et al., 1997). The single conjunction fallacy means that
respondents judge the conjunctive estimate being higher than one
of the constituent and being lower than the other constituent.
The double conjunction fallacy means that respondents judge the
conjunctive estimate being higher than both of the constituents.
The observed high error rate is most extraordinary and was even
up to 87% in Tversky and Kahneman (1983). Strikingly, even in
a distinct, succinct Linda problem in which only three statements
T, F, and T ∧ F were presented to participants, it was still found
in Tversky and Kahneman (1983) that 85% of the participants
rated T ∧ F as more probable than T. The accumulated evidence
of experimentation from 1980s has suggested that the violation is
highly robust to variations in response modes and is very easy to
replicate in a variety of contexts.
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Major theoretical interpretations postulate that the conjunc-
tion fallacy is unquestionably considered a probabilistic error (e.g.,
Tversky andKahneman,1983; Bar-Hillel andNeter,1993; Costello,
2009) or linguistic misapprehension (e.g., Wolford et al., 1990;
Politzer and Noveck, 1991; Hertwig et al., 2008; Hartmann and
Meijs, 2012). For instance, Costello (2009) proposed that partic-
ipants represent the conjunction as an effect of random error in
the judgment process. Politzer and Noveck (1991) argued that
the task demands are likely to compel participants to misinterpret
a base statement (e.g., T) as the conjunction of the base state-
ment and the complement of an added statement [e.g., T ∧ ¬F
(Linda is a bank teller and she is not a feminist)]. Therefore, when
assuming that T and F are independent and that participants’
probability estimate on F is larger than 0.5, the probability of
T ∧ F is larger than the probability of T ∧ ¬F. However, Moro
(2009) provided indirect support for the reasoning bias hypoth-
esis against the misunderstanding hypothesis (also see, Wedell
and Moro, 2008). Furthermore, Tentori and Crupi (2012; also
see, Tentori et al., 2004) obtained results overtly contradictory to
the claims of Hertwig et al. (2008, p. 740) that the conjunction
fallacy should be instead considered as reﬂecting“reasonable prag-
matic and semantic inferences.” In short, the misunderstanding
explanation attributes the conjunction and disjunction fallacies to
people’s mistake on comprehending the connecting words or the
statements.
On the other hand, some critical explanations that have been
proposed based on Bayesian solutions suggested that the con-
junction fallacy might not be fallacious in certain circumstances
(among others Bovens and Hartmann, 2003; Busemeyer et al.,
2011; Tentori et al., 2013). For instance, Bovens and Hartmann
(2003) explicitly argued from source reliability perspective that
the conjunction fallacy can be accounted for in a Bayesian frame-
work given prior beliefs in the likelihood of Linda being a feminist
given her background description. They argue that participants
who believe T ∧ F more than T are rational if and only if:
Prob = Prob(T, F|RepT, RepF) – Prob(T |RepT) > 0, where
RepT denotes a report of T by the participants’ certain witness
scenario. If so, the respondents would, in a Bayesian perspec-
tive, not be committing a reasoning fallacy when responding that
T ∧ F is more likely than T. Busemeyer et al. (2011) proposed
that in accordance with a generalization of Bayesian probability
theory, quantum probability model can explain the conjunc-
tion fallacy, though Tentori and Crupi (2013) argued against
their approach’s explanation. Tentori et al. (2013) put forth new
empirical ﬁndings as deﬁned by contemporary Bayesian theory of
argument that the conjunction fallacy depends on the added con-
junct (e.g., F) being perceived as inductively conﬁrmed rather than
some of competing explanations’, e.g., the averaging hypothesis
(Fantino et al., 1997), the random error model (Costello, 2009),
proposals that the conjunction fallacy rates would rise as the pos-
terior probability of the added conjunct does. Tentori et al. (2013)
argued that their results cannot be explained by those preva-
lent judgment models and provide new evidence for the role of
inductive conﬁrmation as a major determinant of the conjunction
fallacy.
A third perspective postulates that the conjunction fallacy
is aroused by incorrectly using certain integrate computing
models (compensatory strategies) or heuristic models (non-
compensatory strategies) (see Gavanski and Roskos-Ewoldsen,
1991 and Betsch and Fiedler, 1999 for a discussion). These
integrate computing models include proposals as diverse as aver-
aging rule hypotheses (Fantino et al., 1997), conﬁgural weighted
average model (Juslin et al., 2009; Nilsson et al., 2009), con-
junction coefﬁcient model (Abelson et al., 1987), fuzzy logical
model of perception (Massaro, 1994), random error model
(Costello, 2009), and signed sum model (Yates and Carlson, 1986).
For instance, Fantino et al. (1997) proposed that people non-
normatively average the likelihood of the two components in
arriving at a judgment of the likelihood of the conjunction. At
the same time, these heuristic models include proposals such
as potential surprise hypothesis (Fisk, 2002) and the equate-to-
differentiate model (Lu, under review). For instance, Lu (under
review) assumes that people implement a judgmental process by
ﬁltering one or several less distinct (or “futile”) dimension(s)
of each propositional statement (e.g., T of T and T of T ∧
F, where T denotes T ’s one dimension) and base their judg-
ments of the relative likelihoods of the joint and single statements
on the values derived from the most distinct dimension. One
statement with a larger outcome of its reserved dimension is pre-
ferred to another statement with a less outcome of its reserved
dimension.
The question of whether people rely on Bayesian rules (no
matter whether Bayesian probability theory is believed in the
correct way or other kind of understandings), the integrative
models, or the heuristic models in their judgment is still in dis-
pute (e.g., Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994; Kemmelmeier, 2009).
However, recent studies, (e.g., Brandstätter et al., 2006; Birn-
baum and LaCroix, 2008; Wang and Li, 2012) have accumulated
some evidence that supports for the heuristic models rather than
the integrative or Bayesian models. As the substitutive rules to
compensate people’s incorrect use of Bayes’ Rule, those inte-
grative models’ explanations, e.g., the weighting and summing
calculation process (Nilsson et al., 2009), assume as usual as the
expectation rule that people should be competent for the needed
quantitative calculation. By contrast, the heuristic models’ inter-
pretations shed light on people’s non-compensatory strategies
and propose a bounded rationality perspective on the phenom-
ena. Furthermore, the heuristic models highlight more closely
people’s fundamental and underlying cognitive processes than
the integrative models that emphasis on outcome prediction or
goodness-of-ﬁtting. The attempt to employ the heuristic models
for modeling cognition has enabled the introduction of several
new concepts in psychology, such as simple heuristics, ecological
or pragmatic rationality, and bounded rationality. The existing
formal Bayesian frameworks (notably classical probability the-
ory) are more and more questioned, and some tendencies have
been gained to employ these heuristic conceptual approaches to
veritably model human judgment illusions under uncertainty,
such as the conjunction fallacy (for the integrative vs. heuris-
tic models’ debate, also see, Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001 for a
discussion).
A number of studies found that a range of boundary factors,
e.g., individual differences of cognitive ability, cognitive styles,
causal reasoning, numeracy measures, and cognitive reﬂection
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(among others Epstein et al., 1995; Stanovich and West, 1998;
Fisk, 2005; Feeney et al., 2007; Morsanyi et al., 2010), inﬂuence
the incidence of the conjunction fallacy. For instance, Epstein
et al. (1995) demonstrated that the inﬂuence of statistical sophis-
tication may slightly account for the conjunction fallacy, though
concrete and unnatural context is ascribed to the primary rea-
son. Feeney et al. (2007) measured participants’ cognitive ability
concerning judgment of numerical series, verbal analogies, arith-
metic computations, superimpositions and so on and found an
association with ability for the categorical materials in the con-
junction fallacy. Fisk (2005) investigated how working-memory
(reading and computation span, information-processing speed,
and progressive matrices) and intellectual functioning inﬂu-
ence on the conjunction fallacy. However, the results generally
found a paradoxical tendency for higher levels of intellectual
and working-memory functioning to be associated with lower
levels of accuracy on the conjunction fallacy except that in
one Bayesian judgment, participants who scored high on the
working-memory measures are more accurate. Stanovich and
West (1998) conﬁrmed that participants of higher cognitive
ability are disproportionately likely to avoid the conjunction
fallacy.
The cognitive style is one of the individual difference vari-
ables that affects one’s performance and more speciﬁcally, the
cognitive processing in judgmental decisions. Messick (1976)
characterized cognitive styles as stable attitudes, preferences, or
habitual strategies that determine individuals’ modes of perceiv-
ing, remembering, thinking, and problem solving. Kozhevnikov
(2007) deﬁned cognitive styles as representing heuristics that
individuals use to process information.
Epstein (1990, 1994, 2003; also see, Kirkpatrick and Epstein,
1993; Epstein et al., 1996, 1999; Pacini et al., 1998; Epstein and
Pacini, 2001; Norris and Epstein, 2011) posited that according
to their cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST), people pro-
cess information by two likely parallel but interacting modes
of cognitive styles: analytical-rational style and experiential-
intuitive style. In general, the analytical-rational style operates
primarily at the conscious level and is computative, inten-
tional, analytic, logical, and relatively affect-free. In contrast,
the experiential-intuitive style is a relatively crude system and is
assumed to be automatic, more rapid processing oriented, and
associative. Epstein (2003) assumes that the analytical-rational
style has capability to understand and correct for the proce-
dure of the experiential-intuitive style, however, the latter style
is unaware and independent of the former style. As a result,
those who are prone to endow with experiential-intuitive style
are capable of eliminating its inﬂuence when they are aware
to behavior more rationally. However, no evidence ever sup-
ports the existence of two totally unrelated cognitive styles. It
is more probable that maybe a single bipolar information pro-
cessing system of intuition-analysis governed by a common set
of principles works on people’s daily cognitions (Hayes et al.,
2003).
Similar to the integrate computing models versus the heuristic
models, the analytical-rational and experiential-intuitive cognitive
styles can be synonymously seen as based on dual-process theories
from social psychology (see, Chaiken and Trope, 1999). Although
the two cognitive styles, the two models, and other similar theories
(such as Chaiken and Trope’s (1999) heuristic-systematic model
and Bargh et al.’s (2001) automatic vs. non-automatic processing)
are different in their labeling of the two processes (e.g., computing
vs. heuristic, rational vs. intuitive, heuristic vs. systematic, auto-
matic vs. non-automatic, etc.), they share common two systems as
described by the two cognitive styles.
It is different from other dual-process models in that ﬁrst, the
CEST put a dual-process procedure in personality traits and unify
them into one organized adaptive processing, rather than consid-
ering it as a separate cognitive constructs in the context of other
theories (Pacini and Epstein, 1999). Cognitive styles in prefer-
ence for rational or intuitive processing are therefore deﬁned and
can also be measured by the CEST. Second, the CEST presents
an adaptive unconscious system in the experiential-intuitive style
according to an evolutionary perspective. Third, the CEST gains
an understanding on how the analytical-rational and experiential-
intuitive cognitive styles can lead to human irrational behaviors
(e.g., Denes-Raj and Epstein, 1994).
According to the CEST’s hypothesis, certain people with the
experiential-intuitive thinking style were likely to commit the
conjunction fallacy, while compared to the idea that other peo-
ple with the analytical-rational thinking style were likely to
avoid the conjunction fallacy. On the other hand, according
to the second explanations’ criticism that there is no conjunc-
tion fallacy at all, therefore, there should be no correlation
between the experiential-intuitive thinking style and the conjunc-
tion fallacy. At the same time, there should be no correlation
between the analytical-rational thinking style and no conjunction
fallacy.
Although some studies have speciﬁcally addressed the correla-
tion between the CEST and the tendency to commit the conjunc-
tion fallacy (see, Epstein et al., 1995, 1999), there is limited research
if any that directly sheds light on how cognitive styles inﬂuence
on the conjunction fallacy. Epstein et al.’s (1995) study focused
on the inﬂuence of context that based on natural-unnatural and
concrete-abstract dimensions. In the study by Epstein et al. (1999),
the degree to which people believe a representativeness heuristic
or a conjunction-rule provide the more compelling solution to the
Linda problem was measured. In sum, Epstein et al. (1999) found
that people’s normal response to the Linda vignette from an expe-
riential perspective results to the usually high rate of conjunction
fallacy, even though a substantial number of people who know and
think of the conjunction rule prefer to use the representativeness
heuristic.
In the remainder of this paper in the light of the frame-
work of the CEST, we attempt to address the void about if
the assumed rational-experiential cognitive styles lead to the
conjunction fallacy. Next, we test this hypothesis.
EXPERIMENT
METHOD
Participants
Two hundred and ﬁfty Chinese bachelor students of ﬁrst, second,
and third-year grades specializing in Chemistry Engineering at the
University of Shanghai for Science and Technology volunteered to
take part in the study. The ages of the participants were between 17
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and 22 years old, and themean agewas 19.8. The female percentage
of the participants was 54%.
Design
A within-subjects design was used. We investigated in four
variations (groups) of the Linda task assessing various afﬁr-
mative events and various conjunctions (see Table 1, for
the conjunctive statements and their constituents used in
the stimulus through Group 1–4). Therefore, the assess-
ment of rational-experiential cognitive styles in all the three
likelihood types of low–low, high–low, high–high marginal
probabilities can be useful to impartially test the CEST’s
hypothesis.
Materials
The questionnaires contained two pages and consisted of the
following two parts:
The ﬁrst part located at the ﬁrst page. and presented a modiﬁed
Linda problem derived from Tversky and Kahneman (1983). For
Group 1 to 4, after reading the same personality description of
Linda (target E), participants in each group were instructed to
estimate on probabilities of two conjunctive statements and their
respective constituents (see Table 1, for the respective stimulus
used in each group). The order of the statements was counter-
balanced. For each group, the independent variable was the two
conjunctive statements and their constituents. Probability judg-
ment andmeasures derived from these, such as conjunction fallacy,
Table 1 | Means and median probability estimates in the experiment.
Probability estimates
Itemsa Mean (%)b Median (%)
Group 1 (N = 104c)
Linda is a bank teller. (T ) 13.3 (1.2) 10
Linda is active in the feminist movement. (F ) 78.1 (1.8) 80
Linda takesYoga classes. (Y ) 42.0 (2.2) 50
Linda is a teacher in elementary school. (P ) 17.7 (1.5) 15
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. (T ∧ F ) 30.2 (2.5) 30
Linda takesYoga classes and is a teacher in elementary school. (Y ∧ P ) 22.3 (2.1) 15.5
Group 2 (N = 37)
Linda is a bank teller. (T ) 32.2 (4.2) 30
Linda is active in the feminist movement. (F ) 67.5 (3.8) 70
Linda is an executive. (D) 39.9 (4.3) 40
Linda subscribes to a popular liberal magazine. (M ) 72.0 (3.8) 80
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. (T ∧ F ) 38.6 (4.2) 40
Linda is an executive and subscribes to a popular liberal magazine. (D ∧ M ) 49.8 (4.1) 50
Group 3 (N = 41)
Linda is an avid reader. (R) 72.1 (2,8) 80
Linda is active in the feminist movement. (F ) 72.2 (2.9) 80
Linda is an executive. (D) 40.0 (3.0) 40
Linda subscribes to a popular liberal magazine. (M ) 68.6 (3.5) 75
Linda is an avid reader and is active in the feminist movement. (R ∧ F ) 66.9 (3.1) 70
Linda is an executive and subscribes to a popular liberal magazine. (D ∧ M ) 44.5 (3.3) 50
Group 4 (N = 42)
Linda is a bank teller. (T ) 24.3 (3.2) 20
Linda is very shy. (S) 11.7 (2.3) 7
Linda is a teacher in elementary school. (P ) 43.7 (4.5) 50
Linda is active in crafts like needlepoint. (C ) 31.2 (3.7) 20
Linda is a bank teller and is very shy. (T ∧ S) 15.2 (2.8) 10
Linda is a teacher in elementary school and is active in crafts like needlepoint. (P ∧ C ) 31.4 (3.6) 30
aIn the version given to participants, the labels P, F, T, Y, R, S, M, C, D, T ∧ F, Y ∧ P, D ∧ M, R ∧ F, T ∧ S, and P ∧ C were omitted.
bStandard errors with 95% conﬁdence intervals are in parentheses. Boldface indicates a signiﬁcant difference, relative to the conjunctions and their corresponding
unlikely constituents (p < 0.05).
cThere are so many more participants in Group 1 because the Experiment was conducted ﬁrstly through Group 1, however, the likelihood types of the Group 1’s
statements are mostly the likelihood type of “Unlikely ∧ Likely” and have not enough data in relation to the types of “Likely ∧ Likely” and “Unlikely ∧ Unlikely.”
On the other hand, some studies indicate that the conjunction fallacies are related to the likelihood types (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1983; Yates and Carlson,
1986; Fantino et al., 1997; Nilsson et al., 2009) and that more conjunction fallacies should be happened in the likelihood type of “Unlikely ∧ Likely” rather than the
likelihood types of “Unlikely ∧ Unlikely” and “Likely ∧ Likely” (e.g., Yates and Carlson, 1986; Fisk, 1996). Thereof, the inﬂuence of the two kind of cognitive styles on
the conjunction fallacy may be potentially affected if single likelihood type, such as T ∧ L (mostly this combination is the likelihood type of “Likely ∧ Likely”), rather
than all of the three likelihood types is concerned. In order to avoid unbalanced potential variable of the likelihood types’ inﬂuence on the Experimental assumption,
“Likely ∧ Likely” and “Unlikely ∧ Unlikely” combinations of likelihood types of the statements through latter three Groups are thereafter included. Needed numbers
of the latter three Groups’ participants are employed to generate much more needed likelihood types.
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were dependent variables. The participants were invited to use a
number in the whole range 0–1 (including 0 and 1) either by dec-
imal, fractional, or percent estimates as a reply to each statement.
It was mentioned in the instructions that when they forecast that
a statement is unlikely to happen, they should determine its prob-
ability within the range of 0–0.50, and when they forecast that a
statement is likely to happen, they should determine its probability
within the range of 0.5–1, where 0 means minimal probability and
1 means maximal probability.
The second part located at the second page and presented the
Rational-Experiential Inventory-10 items short version (the REI-
10; Epstein et al., 1996) with a separate scale for rational and
experiential thinking styles, corresponding to analytic and heuris-
tic processing respectively. The REI-10 consists of two sub-scales:
need for cognition (NFC; e.g., “I would prefer complex to simple
problems”) and faith in intuition (FI; e.g., “My initial impressions
of people are almost always right”). The NFC scale is intended to
measure an individual’s tendency to enjoy and seek challenging
intellectual experiences, while the FI scale is intended to assess
an individual’s reliance on experiential processing. Each scale is
divided into ﬁve statements respectively for NFC and FI. The inde-
pendent variable is the REI-10. Scores and measures derived from
these items are dependent variables. One bilingual person and the
experimenter (myself) independently translated all the items into
Chinese, and some 80% of the translations were exactly the same;
for the rest of 20% both translations were sent to a third person to
decide upon the best wording. A check was carried out by translat-
ing the Chinese items back into English. The participants through
Group 1–4 scored each item on a 5-point scale. Because the rating
scales ranged from 1 (completely false) to 5 (completely true), the
higher the numerical rating was, the higher the level of agreement
with a scale item. Two of the NFC items were reverse scored.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted in four quiet classrooms. As the
study presented no more than minimal risk of harm to the par-
ticipants and involved no procedures for which written consent
is normally required outside of the study context, the Ethics
Committee speciﬁcally approved verbal informed consent being
provided to the participants in lieu of signed informed consent.
The experimenter (myself) read out loud the verbal informed
consent at the outset of the experiment. All of the participants
consented to participate in the experiment. After that, the experi-
menter (myself) read out loud a general instruction to inform the
participants that the questionnaires were designed to look for the
way that people make their judgments under uncertain situation.
Then the experimenter gave each participant one leaﬂet pre-
sented with instructions and questions. Questions were answered
individually at the participants’ seats.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Probabilities
Participants whose answers for the ﬁrst part were incomplete (by
omitting probability judgments of at least one statement except
for the unrelated statement in each group) were excluded from
the analysis (N = 26). For the remaining 224 participants, the
means and median probability estimates from Group 1–4 for the
corresponding two conjunctive statements and their respective
constituents are shown in Table 1, with SEs (95% conﬁdence inter-
val) in parentheses. Results of paired t test showed that the mean
estimates for all of the conjunctions through Group 1–4 were sig-
niﬁcantly greater than the mean estimates for their corresponding
unlikely constituents [t(103) = −7.723, p < 0.05 for T ∧ F and its
corresponding unlikely constituent in Group 1; t(103) = −4.094,
p < 0.05 for Y ∧ P and its corresponding unlikely constituent in
Group 1; t(36) = −1.881, p < 0.05 for T ∧ F and its correspond-
ing unlikely constituent in Group 2; t(36) = −3.724, p < 0.05
for D ∧ M and its corresponding unlikely constituent in Group 2;
t(40) = −1.275, p < 0.05 for R ∧ F and its corresponding unlikely
constituent inGroup 3; t(40)=−1.925, p< 0.05 forD ∧M and its
corresponding unlikely constituent in Group 3; t(41) = −2.566,
p < 0.05 for T ∧ S and its corresponding unlikely constituent in
Group 4; t(41)=−3.066, p< 0.05 forP ∧C and its corresponding
unlikely constituent in Group 4], as shown in bold on signiﬁcant
effects.
Components and conjunction fallacy
A weighted average of 49.78% single conjunction fallacy (min
34.2%, max 64.5%) and a weighted average of 16.7% double con-
junction fallacy (min 7.1%, max 31.7%) were made. Totally the
participants made a weighted average of 66.48% single and double
conjunction fallacies.
Individual differences
For the NFC sub-scale, there were 219 participants included in the
analysis and 217 included for the FI sub-scale. As ﬁve participants
did not give rating for any of the items in the REI-10 and two
participants only responded to theNFC sub-scale and four itemsof
the FI sub-scale, the data for the left item could not be identiﬁed in
the pre-testing data set. The mean score for the Rational scale was
2.7 (SD = 0.65) and for the Experiential scale was 3.2 (SD = 0.67).
Analyses of the inter-correlations between the REI-10 sub-scales
essentially replicated those of Epstein et al. (1996) in that the NFC
and FI scales showed no correlation (R2 = 0.010, p = 0.141),
supporting the claim of Epstein et al. (1996) that, to a certain
extent, rational and experiential processes are independent.
Also no correlations were found between REI-10 scores and
performance of the conjunction fallacy (N = 219, correlation
coefﬁcient ρ = 0.022 for NFC; N = 217, correlation coefﬁcient
ρ = 0.026 for FI), so scores were categorized by SD for further
analysis. REI-10 scores were coded as high if they were more
than 1 SD above the mean, medium if they were within 1 SD
of the mean, or low if they were more than 1 SD below the
mean.When the rational scale scores were categorized by SD,how-
ever, no signiﬁcant relationships were found among the rational
scale scores with the conjunction fallacy (N = 220, χ2 = 2.611,
degrees of freedom = 4, p = 0.625, and correlation coefﬁcient
ρ = −0.037). Participants with high rational scores did not per-
form signiﬁcantly better than those with medium or low scores,
and participants with medium rational scores did also not per-
form signiﬁcantly better than those with low scores in the Linda
problem. Regression analysis showed that no gradient increase,
e.g., the analytical-rational thinking style, was positively corre-
lated with their performance (N = 219, R2 = 0.001, F = 0.11,
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and p = 0.741 for NFC) and that no gradient decrease, e.g.,
the experiential-intuitive cognitive style, was positively corre-
lated with their performance (N = 217, R2 = 0.001, F = 0.143,
and p = 0.706 for FI) in the conjunction fallacy. Furthermore,
Epstein et al. (1996) classiﬁed four independent types of think-
ing styles for processing information: rational (high rational and
low intuitive), intuitive (low rational and high intuitive), comple-
mentary (high rational and high intuitive), and poor (low rational
and low intuitive). Results showed that the participants’ perfor-
mance on the conjunction problem were not related to any of
the four types of the thinking styles (N = 1691, χ2 = 2.508,
degrees of freedom = 6, p = 0.868, and correlation coefﬁcient
ρ = 0.037). It is indefensible to predict that reliance on the
analytical-rational cognitive processing will account for avoidance
of the conjunction fallacy and that reliance on the intuitive-
experiential cognitive processing will account for commitment of
the conjunction fallacy.
These ﬁndings preliminarily contradicted the CEST’s predic-
tion that participants who are characterized by “rational thinking”
with high scores on the NFC and low scores on the FI are more
inclined to use Bayes’ deduction than other participants who are
labeled by “intuitive thinking” with low scores on the NFC and
high scores on the FI or by “poor thinking” with low scores both
on the NFC and FI. Of course, this speculation may be reversed
based on a critical assumption: rational vs. experiential processing
is not a static variable, but rather may change as an individual has
more diverse life experiences that impel him or her to question the
value of experiential processing.
CONCLUSIONS
So far there are basically two perspectives regarding how people
cognize the world. The ﬁrst perspective has been underpinned
by some experiments (e.g., Epstein et al., 1996; Stanovich and
West, 1998; De Neys, 2006) that people rely on fundamentally two
contrasting cognitive systems: the rational-analytical (or the so-
called executive analytic) system and the experiential-intuitive (or
the so-called automatic-heuristic) system. The two systems pro-
vide people dual-processing modes of reasoning in order to help
them cope better with daily judgment and decision making. On
the contrary, unlike the advocation by the dual-process theorists
mentioned above, the second perspective declares that actually
humans and animals make inference under limited logic deduc-
tion, cognitive capacities, knowledge, and time about the world.
Therefore, viewpoints from ecological, bounded rationality indi-
cate that people inference by a family of algorithms based on a
simple psychological mechanism so-called the pragmatic heuris-
tics (e.g., “Take The Best” algorithm by Gigerenzer and Goldstein,
1996).
The two camps of rational versus experiential cognitive styles
and pragmatic heuristics are still debating whether the famous
conjunction fallacy is the consequence of people’s automatically
intuitive responses or the consequence of some particular cog-
nitive algorithms that people implement (see, Lu, under review,
for a discussion). Although cognitive styles can be considered as
1Participants whose scores on the NFC or FI equated to 3 (intermediate) were
excluded from the data analysis because they entailed no inclinations.
a personality trait with stabile specialities and can be measurable
with designated self-report, it is still difﬁcult to distinguish when
computative analytic processing or instinct experiential process-
ing is used in people’s reasoning. The class of pragmatic heuristics
based on ecological and bounded rationality is possibly the actual
result of an attempt to regulate the inner psychological balance
between the emotional (intuitive) and the cognitive (rational)
cognitive styles.
The role that individual differences (e.g., causal reasoning,
cognitive ability, cognitive reﬂection, numeracy measures, and
rational and intuitive thinking styles) play on some other judg-
ment and decision tasks or biases has been also widely investigated
so far (among others Shiloh et al., 2002; Peters et al., 2006;
Liberali et al., 2012). For instance, Peters et al. (2006) found that
highly numerate individuals are more affective and precise on
judgment and decision tasks. They also found that highly numer-
ate individuals are less likely to be susceptible to framing effects.
It is worth mentioning that Liberali et al. (2012) related the
analytical-rational and experiential-intuitive thinking styles of
the CEST to numeracy measures and cognitive reﬂection rather
than to the conjunction fallacy. Generally their results indicated
that different aspects of numeracy (i.e., computational skills,
metacognitive monitoring, and understanding the gist of rela-
tive magnitude) predict different biases and fallacies. Similarly,
Shiloh et al. (2002) related the analytical-rational and experiential-
intuitive thinking styles of the CEST to normative-statistical
responses and framing effects rather than to the conjunction fal-
lacy. Their studies found that normative-statistical responses are
correlated positively with rational thinking style, and negatively
with experiential-intuitive thinking style. On the other hand, spe-
ciﬁc combinations of thinking styles, high rational/high intuitive
and low rational/low intuitive, are the ones most prone to framing
effects.
The present paper attempted to address the void of correla-
tions between cognitive styles and the conjunction fallacy based
on the CEST model’s assumption of two rational and experiential
systems (Epstein et al., 1996). The results found that low sig-
niﬁcant correlations between participants’ underlying cognitive
styles and the conjunction fallacy contradicted the assumption
that those participants with low rational and high experien-
tial traits are easier to commit the conjunction fallacy than the
other groups. Therefore, the present study indicates that peo-
ple either with analytical-rational or experiential-intuitive (or
so-called automatic-heuristic cognitive style) cognitive style does
not inﬂuence the propensity for committing the conjunction
fallacy.
It is noteworthy that for our limited sample age, context vari-
ation, and the employment of the REI-10, the present ﬁndings
on the correlations between cognitive styles and the conjunction
fallacy should be regarded as preliminary. Specially to note that
though it has been established that the revised version of the REI
scale (see, Pacini and Epstein, 1999; the scales for analytical and
intuitive thinking both consist of 20 items) shows psychometric
properties that increase the reliability of the instrument than the
REI-10, considering for a limited experiment time, the current
study still continued to use the more simpliﬁed REI-10 to measure
the rational-experiential cognitive style.
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In addition, ranking and probability estimation are two
responsemodes that are commonly used in the conjunction fallacy
as well as other studies. Hertwig and Chase (1998) conﬁrmed that
the probability estimation mode is assumed to trigger an integrate
computing model (compensatory strategy) and the ranking mode
to trigger a heuristic model (non-compensatory strategy). There-
fore, the ranking mode may lead to more heuristic thinking than
the probability estimation mode to induce the conjunction fal-
lacy. It is noted that in their studies, a self-report questionnaire
was used to measure which strategy their participants used to esti-
mate probabilities or rank orders. However, as an explicit schema,
the self-report technique is criticized to be susceptible to con-
scious explicit processing, i.e., participants may alter their more
experiential-intuitive responses on a questionnaire. On the con-
trary, REI technique, as an implicit schema, is believed to be able to
avoid conscious explicit problem. Further research might exam-
ine whether the experiential-intuitive cognitive style is inclining to
lead to the conjunction fallacy and the rational-experiential cog-
nitive style to no conjunction fallacy when asking participants to
rank the Linda statements’ orders rather than asking participants
to estimate probabilities in the current Experiment.
Other further research might examine the possibility that shifts
and interacts in information processing, take into account more
closely on the concrete information procession for the underlying
mechanisms of the conjunction fallacy phenomena, and develop
quantitatively speciﬁed cognitive process models of behavioral
intentions to account for judgmental biases.
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